Most geopolitical and relocation commentary is unfalsifiable. Sovereo is not. Every forward call enters this ledger with a numerical confidence and a scoring date, and is marked correct or wrong on that date. Nothing is removed. This is the record behind the Brief.
Honest framing: four calls have reached their scoring date, and all four resolved correct, at 82, 72, 88, and 95. That is not yet a track record, and every one sat in the confident bands, so the ledger has not been tested where it is least sure. The next wave is close and clustered. Six calls fall due between August 18 and 21, and four of those sit on the same Iran and Houthi storyline, so they will resolve together rather than as four independent tests. One of them, 013-1, has already met its condition and is marked Met, though the rule forbids scoring it before its date. The record fills out through September and October. Confidence values here reflect the ledger after the August 12 revision, version 0.17. Every forecast ever made is listed below, open and closed, with none withdrawn, and the misses will appear here beside the hits, on their dates.
| ID | Forecast | Confidence | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| 001-1 | Mojtaba Khamenei will not appear in unmediated, live public video by the end of the two-week ceasefire window on April 22, 2026. | 82 | Correct |
| 002-1 | The ceasefire window extends beyond April 22 without a signed agreement. | 72 | Correct |
| 007-1 | The June 21 Colombian presidential runoff produces a result certified by the CNE, with the losing candidate conceding or accepting, within seven days of the vote, by June 28, 2026. | 88 | Correct |
| 003-1 | Proyecto de Ley 238 de 2025, restricting foreign ownership of rural agricultural land, will not pass into law before the August 7 inauguration. | 95 | Correct |
| 015-7 | Portugal does not publish an amendment to the Regulamento da Nacionalidade in the Diario da Republica on or before August 16, 2026. | 84 | Open |
| 008-1 | The Strait of Hormuz free-passage arrangement opened by the June 2026 memorandum is renewed or extended at its mid-August expiry rather than allowed to lapse into a renewed closure. | 22 | Open |
| 011-1 | No new or restored US Treasury general license authorizing Iranian crude oil sales is issued on or before August 20, 2026. | 84 | Open |
| 012-1 | No attack on a vessel transiting the Bab al Mandab strait, attributed to Iran by two independent sources, is confirmed on or before August 20, 2026. | 55 | Open |
| 013-1 | The Houthi-declared naval blockade of Saudi Arabia produces at least one further confirmed attack on a vessel, beyond the July 22 Encelia and Layla strikes, before August 21, 2026. | 99 | Met |
| 014-2 | The Houthi-declared naval blockade of Saudi Arabia is not publicly rescinded or suspended before August 21, 2026. | 74 | Open |
| 016-4 | Colombia publishes an Article 215 economic emergency decree on or before August 26, 2026. | 85 | Open |
| 015-1 | Iran and Oman publish or officially announce a joint statement, memorandum, or named framework setting navigation terms for the Strait of Hormuz, on or before August 31, 2026. | 58 | Open |
| 016-3 | A Gulf foreign ministry attributes a further Strait of Hormuz vessel attack to a named party on or before September 15, 2026. | 82 | Open |
| 010-1 | The Federal Reserve does not cut the federal funds rate below the current 3.50 to 3.75 percent floor at either of its next two meetings. | 86 | Open |
| 013-2 | The Federal Reserve raises the federal funds rate at either its July or September 2026 meeting, above the current 3.50 to 3.75 percent floor. | 16 | Open |
| 014-3 | No Iran-Oman framework agreement on Strait of Hormuz navigation is published or officially announced on or before September 30, 2026. | 14 | Open |
| 015-2 | The United States does not publicly accept any arrangement under which Iran collects a fee, toll, or service charge from commercial vessels transiting the strait, on or before September 30, 2026. | 74 | Open |
| 015-3 | Argentina's Senate passes the Ley de Propiedad Privada containing a cap on foreign ownership of rural land at 25 percent or lower, on or before September 30, 2026. | 18 | Open |
| 015-4 | Daily transit calls through the Strait of Hormuz do not recover to a seven-day average of 50 or more vessels on or before September 30, 2026. | 55 | Open |
| 009-1 | The Iran war premium in gold stays unwound through Q3 2026, with no new all-time high and no LBMA PM fixing reaching the January 28 peak. | 71 | Open |
| 015-6 | No published schedule of fees, tolls, or service charges for transiting the Strait of Hormuz is issued by Iran, by Oman, or by a joint body, on or before October 31, 2026. | 70 | Open |
| 015-5 | Saudi Arabia's Q3 2026 GASTAT flash GDP estimate shows a further year-on-year real GDP contraction. | 70 | Open |
| 014-1 | China does not fully extend its suspension of the October 2025 rare-earth export-control expansion before November 10, 2026, so the second wave takes effect. | 62 | Open |
| 014-4 | No motion of presidential vacancy against President Keiko Fujimori is admitted to debate by Peru's Congress before December 31, 2026. | 76 | Open |
| 015-8 | The United Kingdom does not lay before Parliament a Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules implementing an extended qualifying period for settlement, on or before December 31, 2026. | 66 | Open |
| 004-1 | CIPS cross-border yuan settlement exceeds an average daily volume of 1 trillion yuan in at least one month between May and December 2026. | 52 | Open |
| 004-2 | At least one Gulf-state flagship international sponsorship deal is publicly canceled, suspended, restructured, or non-renewed by December 31, 2026. | 55 | Open |
| 005-1 | The United States signs at least one new bilateral critical-minerals framework or memorandum with a Latin American government between May 29 and December 31, 2026. | 71 | Open |
| 006-1 | At least three of the 2026 bilateral critical-minerals frameworks produce a published reference-pricing mechanism naming a specific pricing methodology by December 31, 2026. | 58 | Open |
| 014-5 | The SSA count of beneficiaries at foreign addresses for December 2026 shows five-year growth at or below 8 percent. | 66 | Open |
| ID | Forecast | Confidence | Result |
|---|---|---|---|
| PT-1 | The AD minority government led by Luis Montenegro passes an Orcamento do Estado para 2027 and avoids an early legislative election before December 31, 2026. | 60 | Open |
| PT-3 | The 10-year standard naturalisation residence requirement enacted by Lei Organica 1/2026 is not reduced back toward 5 years before December 31, 2026. | 84 | Open |
| MU-1 | The doubling of non-citizen scheme property duty from 5 to 10 percent takes effect on July 1, 2026 and is not reversed before December 31, 2026. | 88 | Open |
| MU-2 | Mauritius retains its Moody's Baa3 investment-grade rating and is not downgraded to sub-investment grade before December 31, 2026. | 58 | Open |
| MU-3 | The Mauritian rupee is weaker against the US dollar at end-2026 than its June 2026 level, above 48.7 per dollar at the last 2026 reading. | 60 | Open |
| PT-2 | The IFICI regime's 20 percent flat rate and general exemption of foreign-source income remain in force through the Orcamento do Estado para 2027 as promulgated. | 67 | Open |
Issue 3 forecast, at 95 and highly likely, that Colombia's Proyecto de Ley 238, the foreign farmland cap, would not pass into law before the August 7 inauguration. The outgoing Congress spent its final sitting week on where to hold the inauguration rather than on the land bill, which was not among the eight reforms refiled on July 20, and the transfer of power proceeded to Cali on August 7. The falsification condition, passage into law before the handover, never triggered. The honest limit still holds: all four calls scored so far sit in the confident bands, so what four hits prove is narrow.
On June 12 the Brief forecast, at 88 and marked highly likely, that Colombia's June 21 runoff would be certified with the losing candidate conceding within seven days. The Consejo Nacional Electoral declared the result on June 24 with 99.997 percent coincidence to the election-night count; Ivan Cepeda conceded the same day. Both certification and concession landed inside the window, and the call scored correct on its stated date, before the transition crisis that followed. The next calls score across August, September, and October.
A forecast is scored only on or after its stated date, never before. An open forecast is live, not a failure. When the date arrives, the call is marked correct or wrong against its explicit falsification condition, and the result stays on the record permanently. A forecast marked Met has already satisfied its condition but is not scored until its date arrives; the discipline of not scoring early holds even when the outcome already looks settled, because a condition can still reverse before the clock runs out.
Every call carries one probability word on a fixed yardstick: remote near 5 percent, unlikely 25 to 35, realistic possibility 40 to 50, likely 55 to 75, highly likely 80 to 90, almost certain 95 or more. Confidence is revised on the evidence between issues, and every revision is recorded with a dated reason in the underlying ledger.
Every forecast the Brief and the Intelligence Dossiers have issued appears here, open and closed. None is withdrawn, softened, or deleted after the fact. The misses will be published beside the hits with the same prominence, on their dates. That discipline, not any single call, is the product.
The ledger is the receipt. The Sovereo Brief is where each call is made, argued, and dated, a week before the market or the headline catches up.
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